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18 March 1959

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR arranging for return of 500 Kurds to Iraq.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sudan - Army move to force further political changes may be imminent.

Indonesian Army mission authorized to seek arms from either West or bloc.




III. THE WEST

④ West Germany - Adenauer publicly rejects all plans for limiting or withdrawing forces in Central Europe.

LATE ITEMS

⑤ The Panamanian Government has been alerted to an imminent revolutionary attempt.

⑥ Jordan - Bedouin officers may attempt to seize control of government after Premier's departure for US.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

18 March 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Iraq: [Plans being worked out by Soviet and Iraqi officials to return 500 Kurds to Iraq from the USSR are "well along," according to an Iraqi diplomat in Moscow. At the present time, Moscow and Iraqi Communists appear to be playing down the theme of an independent Kurdish state in favor of joint Kurdish-Arab support for the "progressive" Qasim regime.] (Page 1)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Sudan: [The dissident officers' group in Sudan led by Brigadier Shannan, commander of the Northern Command, is reported to have advanced the date from 22 to 19 March for its attempt to take full control of the government.]

[] the commander of the Western Command was proceeding that day by plane to Khartoum "on a very important mission." The trip would appear to be connected with current political maneuvering there. Continuing scheduled rotation of troop units could provide a screen for another abrupt movement of troops to the capital.]

Indonesia: An army mission is now exploring the feasibility of further military procurement in the United States and in Western and Eastern Europe. It is authorized, at its discretion, to investigate Czech and Polish offers for the construction of an arms factory in Indonesia. The air force is believed arranging additional purchases of aircraft and equipment from Czechoslovakia. (Page 2)

III. THE WEST

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West Germany: Chancellor Adenauer has publicly made a sweeping rejection of all plans for limiting or withdrawing armed forces in Central Europe. Despite an appearance of "complete unanimity" in his 12-13 March talks with Macmillan, Adenauer's attack on disengagement is aimed at London; it is also designed to correct any public misinterpretation of Bonn's position. [A top foreign policy adviser in Adenauer's party, feeling it necessary to make concessions to public opinion, favor putting forward a disengagement plan designed, however, to be unacceptable to Moscow.]

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IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

No
 The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions were to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):

1. The USSR will not turn over access controls to the GDR in the near future. However, the Soviets continue to carry out measures necessary to a withdrawal of their forces from East Berlin, and the physical transfer of access controls could be accomplished with very little or no advance warning.
2. There are no reliable indications of a Soviet intent in the near future to harass or blockade Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin from the East. However, the Soviets could take such actions with little or no warning.
3. The West Berlin population remains basically calm and believes that if the West stands firm, the USSR will not drive the matter to armed conflict. However,

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some informed West Berliners are concerned over what they consider an apparent lack of Allied unity on what actions should be taken.
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LATE ITEMS

NO

*Panama: The government has been alerted to expect an imminent revolutionary attempt, possibly as early as 18 March. The interior minister expects simultaneous uprisings in Panama City and in the interior. He believes the effort is to be led by dissident First Vice President Diaz, who has the backing of Roberto Arias, a wealthy political intriguer who has recently been in Cuba seeking arms for an attempt against the moderate De la Guardia administration. The interior minister said the government will welcome the revolutionary attempt since it is confident of suppressing it and administration leaders are tired of the opposition's continual threats of violence which have concerned them for over a year. [redacted]

*Jordan: Officers of the influential Bani Sakhr Bedouin tribe may attempt to seize control of the government following Premier Rifai's scheduled departure on 18 March to join King Husayn in the United States. [redacted]

NO

[redacted] the contention that the Bedouin officers have obtained Nasir's assurance of support because the tribesmen have traditionally supported the monarchy; however, UAR contacts with Bedouin officers have been reported in recent months. The current withdrawal of certain military units from West Jordan will further increase Bedouin strength around Amman. Last week end's arrests of about ten officers of a rival faction, at the direction of Armed Forces Chief of Staff Habis Majalli, a Bedouin, was reportedly intended to prepare the ground for the Bani Sakhr coup. [redacted]

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR to Repatriate Kurds to Iraq

[Plans now being worked out by Soviet and Iraqi officials to return 500 Kurds to Iraq from the USSR are "well along,"
 Of this number, about 100 were said to be located in the Moscow area, with the remainder around Tashkent.]

[These Kurds are almost certainly from among those who fled to the USSR following the suppression of the short-lived Kurdish People's Republic which was established with Soviet encouragement in northwestern Iran in late 1945. Individual Kurds, such as Mullah Mustafa Barzani--military leader during the 1945 uprising--have returned to Iraq since Qasim's coup, but this would be the largest group of returnees to date. Soviet authorities can be expected to make an effort to include among the returnees agents and Communist sympathizers.]

[Kurdish responsiveness to bloc and local Communist agitation for an independent state constitutes a potentially useful Soviet instrument for exerting pressure on the countries in which the Kurds reside. However, both Moscow and the Iraqi Communists at present are playing down the theme of an independent Kurdish state in favor of joint Kurdish-Arab support for the "progressive" Qasim regime, probably because of the disruptive effect such subversive activity would have on a pro-bloc Iraq. Furthermore, Mullah Mustafa apparently is satisfied, as are many Kurds, with Qasim's treatment of the Kurdish minority.]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indonesian Military Missions Seek More Arms

An Indonesian Army purchasing mission is exploring the feasibility of further military procurement in the United States and in Western and Eastern Europe. It is authorized to investigate credit possibilities for the construction of a \$60-\$80,000,000 arms factory in Indonesia. [redacted]

[redacted] the mission hopes to interest a West German firm in the project. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, however, have already submitted estimates. The satellite credit terms to date have been so much more liberal than those of the West that a contract with a bloc country appears more likely.

The army mission probably will also purchase additional arms and military equipment. The Indonesian Army contracted for \$21,000,000 worth of arms from Poland and Czechoslovakia during early 1958 and has since revealed an interest in further purchases.

The Indonesian Air Force bought on credit almost \$60,000,000 worth of aircraft and equipment in 1958, and has since bought aircraft from the European satellites and Communist China. It still has about \$35,000,000 remaining from its government-approved allotment with which to make additional purchases. [redacted] an Indonesian Air Force mission went to Czechoslovakia in February and that another mission will go there in early April in connection with "Project Chakra," presumably a code name for new purchases of aircraft.

Indonesian arms purchases under bloc credits now total more than \$170,000,000. [redacted]

[redacted]

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III. THE WEST

Adenauer Rejects All Disengagement Schemes for Central Europe

Chancellor Adenauer on 16 March rejected outright all plans to reduce or withdraw Western troops from Central Europe on the grounds that such schemes endanger Western security. Writing in a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) publication, he stressed that military solutions were unacceptable unless accompanied by political solutions. [redacted]

[redacted] Adenauer is reported to have shown "rigid" resistance to any departure from established positions in the direction of disengagement.]

Adenauer's sharp attack on disengagement is probably aimed at London and may reflect a misunderstanding between him and Macmillan in their talks on 14 March. Despite the public appearance of complete unanimity in the talks, no agreement was reached on the problem of thinning out forces in Central Europe. Adenauer's remarks are probably an effort to counteract the widespread German press comment to the effect that he accepted the British view on relaxing tensions in Central Europe through an inspected "freeze" on military forces followed by reduction.

[A number of usually firm Adenauer supporters in the Bundestag increasingly feel that some such flexible plan must be worked out as a means of retaining public support in West Germany, and Foreign Minister Brentano is also reported to favor such a tactical move. Adenauer, however, is opposed to such a plan, even if it is deliberately designed to be unacceptable to Moscow.] [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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